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ROLE OF PHYSICAL-SELECTION PROCEDURES
IN THE DISPARATE IMPACT NARRATIVE
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†

Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson
in 1977, gender-based disparate impact litigation has been limited in scope, but
there remains room for growth. This Comment focuses on one particularly successful subset of gender-based disparate impact cases, physical-selection procedures. An examination of these decisions shows that plaintiffs have faced an
uphill battle in combating unfounded assumptions, both in establishing a prima
facie case as well as in rebutting the affirmative defense. Indeed, some lower
courts have relied on arguments that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court case
law as it has progressed since Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
At the same time, the success of physical-selection procedure cases offers hope
for expansion going forward. By contextualizing an industry’s practices, referring
to narratives of female applicants, and providing examples of reasonable alternatives, advocates have succeeded in positively framing their arguments in a manner that factfinders are likely to welcome. In doing so, advocates can help reclaim
the ideals of Title VII and the disparate impact movement.
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INTRODUCTION
The merits and potential of disparate impact theory have been en1
thusiastically championed and critically debated since its Supreme

1

See, e.g., Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring
Employer Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 280 (2002)
(contending that disparate impact theory could be used to “make a prima facie showing of discrimination based on sex” for employers’ failure to accommodate breastfeeding women in the workplace); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 341-73 (2003) (proposing the use of disparate impact
theory to equalize women’s access to telecommuting options); see also Reva Siegel, Why
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1145 (1997) (arguing that disparate impact theory litigation could
“move the nation closer to disestablishing . . . gender stratification than current constitutional doctrines now do”).
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Court inception in 1971. Indeed, the Court’s most recent decision,
Ricci v. DeStefano, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of
an employer’s reaction to allegations of a disparate impact on African
3
American candidates as a result of written promotion exams, has reinvigorated the discourse but provided few answers. Most of the disparate
impact debate after Ricci has understandably centered on the future of
4
race-based claims. Professors Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, and
Trina Jones, for example, have argued that the Ricci decision signaled
5
the Court’s intent to enter a realm of “post-race equal protection.” Yet
this race-focused discourse obfuscates the fact that female disparate
impact claimants face disparities at least as dramatic as those faced by
African American claimants. And almost no attention has been paid
after Ricci to how gender-based disparate impact cases have fared or
6
what the doctrine’s future prospects are for success.
In this Comment, I focus on one increasingly prevalent subset of
gender-based disparate impact litigation: physical-selection procedure
cases. Physical-selection procedure litigation typically features female
plaintiffs who challenge the use of certain employer-instituted tests,
such as wall climbs and timed mile runs, which act as barriers to female
entry into traditionally male-dominated jobs. In deciding these cases,
courts tend to rely on a number of unfounded assumptions, particularly
with regard to the relationship between strength and safety, and make
2

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under the [Civil Rights]
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”).
3
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). For a discussion of the Ricci opinion and its implications for disparate impact litigation, see infra notes 41-49.
4
See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 994-95 (2010) (concluding that after Ricci, civil rights advocates “may have to defend [race-based] disparate impact claims from eradication”);
Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90
B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2183 (2010) (arguing that Ricci “hints at a sweeping new affirmative
defense for unintentional, disparate-impact claims brought under Title VII”); Michael
J. Zimmer, Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended
Consequences?, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1307 (reasoning that “the ease with which [the
Court] found disparate treatment may have the ironic effect of opening new avenues
for civil rights advocates to more easily and therefore more successfully bring disparate
treatment actions”).
5
Barnes, Chemerinsky, & Jones, supra note 4, at 994-95.
6
To my knowledge, no literature has yet explored how Ricci has affected genderbased disparate impact claims. For one example of a district court’s attempt to decide
a gender-based disparate impact claim after Ricci, see United States v. Massachusetts,
781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4, 11-21 (D. Mass. 2011).
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assertions that are inconsistent with disparate impact theory as articu7
lated in Supreme Court opinions from Griggs v. Duke Power Co. onward.
However, plaintiffs who confront these flawed assumptions have been
8
able to achieve success in a number of lower courts. In this Comment,
I identify the roadblocks commonly facing physical-selection procedure
claims and suggest best practices that might enable claimants to overcome them.
Part I of this Comment describes the standard (mostly race-based)
9
disparate impact doctrine as it has evolved since Griggs. Part II examines the gender-based disparate impact movement, demonstrating that
its expansion beyond height and weight requirements has, for the
most part, been limited. In marked contrast, litigation surrounding
physical-selection procedures has had atypical success in lower courts.
Parts III and IV focus on lower court decisions in physical-selection
procedure cases and identify patterns that help to explain why certain
plaintiffs succeed where others fail. I argue that successful plaintiffs
have been able to bypass certain common obstacles, including arguments that females must train for their examinations and arguments
that physical-selection procedures are a business necessity. In unsuccessful physical-selection procedure cases, courts have misinterpreted
Supreme Court precedent and relied instead on unproven assumptions that ignore the reality of the employer’s actual needs.
I conclude in Part IV with suggestions that may enable future
gender-based disparate impact advocates to find greater success. Advocates should first contextualize the industry and the particular employment practice. Second, advocates should attempt to humanize the
consequences of these questionable practices and misguided assumptions by referring to the specific narratives of applicants. Third, advocates should provide concrete examples of reasonable alternatives to the
challenged procedure. Finally, advocates should consistently ground
their arguments in the disparate impact theory as put forth in Griggs. In
doing so, advocates will further not only the progress of gender-based
causes but also the disparate impact movement at large.

7

401 U.S. 424 (1971). For discussion of the Griggs case, see infra Section I.A.
For a list of these cases, see infra note 82.
9
The majority of this narration focuses on race-based disparate impact doctrine for
one simple reason: the Court has granted certiorari almost exclusively in race-based
disparate impact cases.
8
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I. THE STANDARD DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE
To understand the current state of disparate impact litigation, it is
important to trace its historical roots from its inception. By examining
10
11
Title VII of the Civil Right Acts of 1964, the Griggs progeny, and the
12
Civil Rights Act of 1991, I aim to make two points: first, the Court
intended disparate impact litigation to serve as a counterpart to dis13
parate treatment cases; second, the Court’s analysis of disparate impact theory has overwhelmingly focused on race-based claims. Thus, a
separate analysis of gender-based disparate impact case law is needed.
A. Griggs and Its Progeny
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court held that Title VII
prohibits neutral employment policies that have a disparate impact on
14
African American plaintiffs without a business necessity justification.
In Griggs, a power plant required its employees to pass two screening
10

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006).
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674-77 (2009) (discussing the Title
VII implications of an employer’s discarding a promotion examination before a court
finds that the test resulted in a disparate impact); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) (clarifying the required components of the business necessity defense), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that subjective employment decisions are covered by the disparate impact doctrine); Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-56 (1982) (rejecting the “bottom line” theory of equality—
which posits that an employer can make up for discrimination by hiring or promoting a
sufficient number of people from the targeted group—as a defense to Title VII liability);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977) (finding that disparate impact
claims are proper for gender discrimination); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 413, 425-36 (1975) (clarifying the standard of proof for the “‘job relatedness’ of
pre-employment tests” in disparate impact litigation).
12
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
13
Title VII prohibits two forms of employment discrimination: disparate impact
and disparate treatment. For the differences between disparate impact and disparate
treatment discrimination, see Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 98-117
(2006). In comparison to disparate impact, disparate treatment is “often thought to
reflect most directly the text of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from taking an
adverse action against an employee ‘because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.’” Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2185 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1)). The “key” to proving disparate treatment discrimination lies in showing an employer’s intent to discriminate. Id. at 2186.
14
401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
11
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tests and have a high school diploma in order to obtain a position out15
side of the labor department. The plaintiffs were able to demonstrate
that this policy had a disproportionately adverse impact on African
Americans.16 The Court held that the “absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to
17
measuring job capability.” Because the power plant could not show
that the test served an overriding business necessity, the Court ultimately
18
held that the employer’s selection procedures violated Title VII.
Relying upon the general language in Griggs, the Court decided
several disparate impact cases clarifying the doctrine in a decidedly
pro-plaintiff manner. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court held
that an employer, in order to comply with Title VII, must demonstrate
by “professionally acceptable methods” that its discriminatory tests are
“predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
19
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job.” Although
the employer in Albemarle, perhaps taking a lesson from its counterpart
in Griggs, had conducted a half-day study to prove that its general ability
tests were correlated with job performance, the Court noted that the
study results were not statistically significant, were highly subjective,
20
and involved an unrepresentative sample group. The Court also created a surrebuttal to the Griggs framework, holding that plaintiffs
could defeat the business necessity defense by showing “that other tests

15

Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 431-33, 436. While the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs were more
likely to fail aptitude tests because they had received “inferior education in segregated
schools,” id. at 430, such a “present effects of past discrimination” argument has been
criticized by at least one scholar. See Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of
Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 804 (1985) (“Under this [past
discrimination] theory, . . . a disparate impact opens the door to litigation over ancient,
but preserved, race-based discrimination.”).
17
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
18
See id. at 431 (“[N]either the high school completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”).
19
422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974)); see also Linda Lye,
Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the
Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 324 (1998) (arguing that the
Albemarle Court “considerably strengthened the disparate impact plaintiff’s hand”).
20
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 429-35.
16
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or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would
21
also serve the employer’s legitimate interest.”
Dothard v. Rawlinson, which prohibited height and weight requirements for employment within prison systems that “had a discrimi22
natory impact on women applicants,” is the only case in which the
Court has ever considered the merits of a gender-based disparate impact claim. The Court in Dothard set forth the following business necessity test: first, a defendant must articulate a quality “essential to
effective job performance,” and second, it must prove that the chal23
lenged practice accurately assesses that quality. The Court also explicitly held that an employer could be liable for using tests that had a
24
disparate impact across gender lines. However, as I argue in Section
II.A, the Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity Dothard presented to strengthen the gender-based disparate impact doctrine.
The next set of decisions, Connecticut v. Teal and Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, contributed rules to the emerging doctrine but
also made moves toward fashioning a more limited cause of action. In
Teal, the employer attempted to compensate for a discriminatory selection procedure by promoting African Americans and ensuring that
the overall result of the process would be an “appropriate racial bal25
ance.” The Court rejected the employer’s contention that its bottomline result could be a complete defense to a disparate impact claim
26
and required that each specific procedure undergo analysis. Yet by
21

Id. at 425. Notably, the Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio attempted to alter
this standard by holding that courts should defer to the employer’s judgment on the effectiveness of such alternative practices. See 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (“[T]he judiciary
should proceed with care before mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiff’s
alternative selection or hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit.”), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). However, Congress expressed its discontent with the Wards Cove approach by expressly overruling it in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and codifying the business necessity defense as it existed prior to Wards Cove. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2006)).
22
433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). Because Part II examines Dothard in greater detail, the
description of the case here only addresses that which is relevant to a general overview
of the disparate impact doctrine.
23
Id. at 331-32; see also id. at 332 (“If the job-related quality that the [employers]
identify is bona fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test
for applicants that measures strength directly.”).
24
See id. at 328-29 (stating that the standard for examining a gender-based disparate
impact claim is the same as that used in Griggs and Albemarle to assess race-based claims).
25
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442-45 (1982).
26
Id. at 442, 452-56.
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directing its analysis to discrete elements of the employer’s procedure,
the Court’s decision foreshadowed its later efforts to limit disparate
impact claims to those in which a specific practice is proved to have
27
caused the alleged wrong.
In Watson, the Court ruled that subjective evaluation processes,
such as interviews, also fall under the purview of the disparate impact
28
doctrine. However, the Court also limited the doctrine’s potential
for effectuating change by increasing the plaintiff’s burden in making
a prima facie case and reducing the defendant’s burden for proving a
29
business necessity defense. Taken together, these cases represent a
shift in the Court’s posture from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant—a
shift that culminated in Wards Cove and prompted Congress to step in
and limit these cases’ impact.
B. Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Court strengthened its pro-defendant posture in Teal and Watson even further in Wards Cove, and, in so doing, triggered a congressional response in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The facts
underlying the plaintiffs’ case in Wards Cove were similar to previous
Title VII cases: a group of cannery workers alleged that a combination
of hiring and promotion practices had resulted in a disparate impact
30
against minorities. However, for the first time in a disparate impact
31
case, the Court decided in favor of the employer-defendant. In finding for the employer, the Court held that the workers’ prima facie case
had to identify a specific employment practice that caused the dispar-

27

Lye, supra note 19, at 329-30.
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988) (“If an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to
see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply.”).
29
See id. at 994, 998 (holding that a plaintiff must pinpoint a “specific employment
practice” that results in a disparate impact, while a defendant need only show some
relationship between its employment selection criteria and the job itself, not “particular
criteria [that] predict on-the-job performance”).
30
490 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44
(2003). Some of the alleged discriminatory employment practices were “nepotism, a
rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, [and] separate hiring channels.”
Id. at 647.
31
Id. at 655, 661.
28
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32

ate impact. In addition, the Court established a relaxed affirmative
defense standard: an employer has an affirmative defense as long as it
establishes that the practice is reasonably related to the employer’s busi33
ness justification. As the Court emphasized, “[T]here is no requirement that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to
34
the employer’s business for it to pass muster.”
At least partially as a response to Wards Cove, the 102nd Congress
35
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. For the first time, Congress provided an explicit statutory basis for disparate impact litigation, stating
in no uncertain terms that disparate impact claims have a legitimate
36
place within Title VII. The Act confirmed that a plaintiff’s prima
facie burden includes establishing that a specific employment practice,
or group of employment practices, caused a disparate impact on a pro37
tected class. At the same time, the Act also rejected the “reasoned
review” standard for an employer’s business necessity established in
38
Wards Cove. The Act declared that Wards Cove had “weakened the
39
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.”
Congress’s insistence on a pre–Wards Cove interpretation of disparate impact helped establish the legitimacy of the modern disparate
impact doctrine and provided advocates a substantive analytical

32

See id. at 657 (“As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate
impact under attack.”).
33
See id. at 659 (“The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer’s justification for his use of the challenged practice.”).
34
Id.
35
See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding The Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1996) (“The
Act . . . purports to restore the law regarding business necessity to its state before Wards
Cove.”).
36
Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2194.
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (“An unlawful employment practice based
on disparate impact is established . . . [if] a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”).
38
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(stating that one of the Act’s purposes was “to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’
and ‘job related’ enunciated . . . [in] Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove”).
39
Id. § 2(2).
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40

framework with which to make their cases. The Supreme Court did
not address the disparate impact doctrine again until 2009.
C. Ricci v. DeStefano: An Update on the Disparate Impact Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano and the implications it holds for disparate impact litigation, affirmative action, and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have generated
41
a lively academic discussion. In Ricci, a group of white and Hispanic
firefighters sued the City of New Haven because it refused to certify the
results of a promotional exam; the firefighters argued that the failure to
42
certify violated Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. The City,
though, maintained that it had refused to certify the exam results because such a certification would have had a disparate impact on minori43
ty firefighters and thus exposed the City to Title VII liability.
The Supreme Court held that an employer is liable under Title VII
if it overturns promotion test results because of race unless the employer can demonstrate that it has a strong evidentiary basis that doing so
44
would cause it to lose a disparate impact lawsuit. The Court concluded
that the City had not demonstrated a sufficient basis in evidence to
show that it would be liable to the unsuccessful test takers in a disparate
45
impact suit had it certified the test results.
The implications of Ricci for the disparate impact doctrine have yet
to be seen; predictions have ranged from hopelessly bleak to cautiously
optimistic. Professor Richard Primus has summarized three possible
interpretations of the Ricci holding. First, it may mean that the “actions necessary to remedy a disparate impact violation are per se in
40

See Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2194 (“With the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, . . . disparate impact finally gained the clear analytic framework it had
lacked since its inception in Griggs.”).
41
See sources cited supra note 4.
42
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 2676-77. In articulating its reasoning for the holding, the Court explained:
But once . . . [a testing] process has been established . . . [employers] may not
then invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race. Doing so, absent a strong basis in evidence of an impermissible disparate impact, amounts to the sort of racial
preference that Congress has disclaimed and is antithetical to the notion of a
workplace where individuals are guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of race.
Id. at 2677 (citation omitted).
45
Id.
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conceptual conflict with the demands of disparate treatment doctrine
(and, implicitly, the demands of equal protection),” sounding the
46
death knell for disparate impact causes of action. Second, Ricci may
be distinguished institutionally, because “public employers, unlike
courts, are not authorized to engage in the race-conscious decision47
making that disparate impact remedies entail.” Third, Ricci may signify that in situations which produce “visible victims”—the white and
48
Hispanic firefighters—the remedy is not proper. Because “the standard judicial remedies all avoid creating [such] visible victims,” this last
reading allows Title VII’s disparate impact standard to survive future
49
constitutional attack.
Notwithstanding the disagreement surrounding disparate impact
remedies after Ricci, the steps involved in disparate impact litigation
50
remain—as of yet—unchanged. First, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant engaged in a practice that had an adverse impact on a
51
protected class. Upon the plaintiff’s sufficient pleading of a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the disparate
46

Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344
(2010). Professor Primus cites Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Ricci and an article by
Ronald Dworkin as two primary examples of this interpretation. Id.
47
Id. at 1344-45.
48
Id. at 1345.
49
Id.; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another
Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2010) (“Reports of the
death of Title VII’s disparate impact theory of discrimination in the wake of Ricci v. DeStefano may be exaggerated.”). But see Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling
Against the “Built-In Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 262
(2011) (arguing that Ricci “may well have done as much to eviscerate disparate impact’s
potential as Wards Cove did twenty years earlier”); Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at
2205-09 (contending that certain interpretations of Ricci, in particular the one that allows
for a new affirmative defense, would impose significant barriers to plaintiffs attempting to
establish disparate impact liability).
50
However, the standards governing the business necessity defense may also be affected by Ricci. Most recently, in Easterling v. Connecticut, a federal district court suggested that the standard for establishing business necessity in disparate impact cases
after Ricci is a “Significantly Correlated Standard”—that is, “a hiring practice is job related if the practice is significantly correlated with elements of work behavior that are
relevant to the job.” 783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 335 (D. Conn. 2011).
There may also be an additional affirmative defense based on a defendant’s awareness of a disparate impact at the time of the alleged discriminatory action. See infra note
96; see also United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 n.3 (D. Mass. 2011) (mentioning such a potential defense but declining to evaluate its merits).
51
See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630
F.2d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that “the common mode of Title VII analysis” requires that the plaintiff first “establish a prima facie case on the basis of disparate impact”).
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impact by establishing a business necessity defense. The defendant
must demonstrate both that the selection procedure adequately tests a
certain skill and that this skill is sufficiently necessary to perform the
53
job. Even if the defendant proves a legitimate business necessity, the
plaintiff may still prevail if she is able to propose an alternative practice that would still provide for the employer’s legitimate business
54
needs but without the disparate impact.
In theory, these steps apply just as easily to selection procedures
based on physical tests (which tend to implicate gender concerns) as
they do to procedures based on written tests (which tend to implicate
race). Yet the fact patterns in race and gender cases seem intuitively
different, and in light of the different standards brought to bear in the
55
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, it is worth pausing for a
52

See, e.g., id. (“[T]he defendant is required to rebut the plaintiff’s case by proving
that the disparity results from legitimate, job-related selection procedures.”).
53
See supra text accompanying note 19; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971) (holding that the employer practice or policy in question must have a
“manifest relationship” to the employee’s job duties). Indeed, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued guidelines to direct courts’ analysis of the
business necessity defense. The defense, under the guidelines, requires that employers’ discriminatory tests be validated by either (1) content-validity, (2) criterion-validity,
or (3) construct-validity studies. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (2011). Content validity can be
established by producing “data showing that the content of the selection procedure is
representative of important aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates
are to be evaluated.” Id. § 1607.5(B). Criterion validity can be established by producing “empirical data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of job performance.” Id. Construct
validity, meanwhile, can be established by producing “data showing that the [employment] procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which have been determined to be important in successful performance in the
job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.” Id.
54
See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (“If an employer
does . . . meet the burden of proving that its tests are ‘job related,’ it remains open to
the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest . . . .”).
55
Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to analyze gender-based classifications under
the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-200, 204 (1976)
(using intermediate scrutiny to strike down a statute that prohibited the sale of beer to
males under the age of twenty-one, while restricting sale to females under the age of
eighteen). In contrast, courts analyze race-based classifications under a more rigorous
standard of judicial review. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications—invidious or benign—imposed by the
federal government are subject to strict scrutiny). While traditional disparate impact
analysis does not implicate constitutional concerns because it is a statutory cause of action, Ricci has demonstrated that invalidating test results due to perceived disparate impact liability can, in some instances, trigger equal protection concerns. See supra notes

Wu FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/11/2012 12:55 PM

Scaling the Wall and Running the Mile

1207

moment to consider gender-specific disparate impact case law. Part II
explains the gender-based disparate impact doctrine as it has developed in the Supreme Court and in lower courts and seeks to provide a
backdrop against which to consider the smaller subset of cases—those
involving physical-selection procedures—that are examined in Part III.
II. THE GENDER-BASED DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE
The disparate impact doctrine applies to any employee who has
been discriminated against “because of” or “on the basis of” that per56
son’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” It is quite logical,
then, for advocates championing the expansion of the gender-based
disparate impact doctrine to turn to Supreme Court jurisprudence
defining disparate impact generally. However, the Supreme Court has
overwhelmingly shaped this doctrine in response to race-based cases.
57
This Part focuses on Dothard v. Rawlinson and its effects on genderbased disparate impact litigation in the lower courts.
A. Dothard v. Rawlinson: Limits to Its Strengths
Any narrative of the gender-based disparate impact doctrine must
begin with Dothard v. Rawlinson, the only gender-based disparate impact
case considered by the Supreme Court to date. In Dothard, Dianne
Rawlinson applied to work as a correctional counselor with the Alabama Board of Corrections but was rejected because she did not meet
58
Alabama’s statutorily imposed 120-pound weight requirement. Plain41-49 and accompanying text. Because the Ricci holding has not been fully developed
with respect to race-based disparate impact cases, much less gender-based cases, this
Comment does not seek to apply equal protection constrictions to gender-based disparate impact claims.
56
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(c) (2006). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amends
Title VII such that the phrases “because of ” and “on the basis of sex” encompass behavior that is “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Id. § 2000e-2(k).
57
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
58
Id. at 323-24. Rawlinson also challenged the legality of the Board’s Administrative
Regulation 204, which “establish[ed] gender criteria for assigning correctional counselors
to ‘contact positions’” in maximum-security facilities. Id. at 324-26. Such positions involved “continual close physical proximity to inmates.” Id. at 325. While the Court found
that Regulation 204 “explicitly discriminate[d] against women on the basis of their sex,” it
upheld the regulation because “being male is . . . a bona fide occupational qualification
for the job of correctional counselor in a ‘contact’ position.” Id. at 332-37. This Comment will not address the bona fide occupational qualification defense to Regulation 204
asserted by the defendants and accepted by the majority, but it is noteworthy that Justice

Wu FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/11/2012 12:55 PM

1208

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 160: 1195

tiffs submitted evidence that Alabama’s height and weight thresholds
combined to exclude over forty percent of the nationwide female
59
population but less than one percent of the male population. The
Court held that this evidence was sufficient to establish that the re60
quirements had a disparate impact on female applicants.
Asserting the business necessity defense, the defendants argued
that the height and weight requirements were related to strength.
Strength, they argued, was “essential to effective job performance” as a
61
prison guard. The Court rejected this argument because the defendants did not provide appropriate evidentiary support for what “amount
of strength” a guard needed to perform effectively or what height or
62
weight would ensure that a guard possessed the requisite strength.
The Court criticized the defendants for failing “to offer evidence of
any kind in specific justification of the statutory standards” and conse63
quently refused to sustain a business necessity defense.
But, by dismissing this defense on the technical grounds that no
statistical analysis was undertaken, the Court did not engage in further
analysis of the defendants’ claims. Instead, the Court stated simply
that “[i]f the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona
fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and validating a test
64
for applicants that measures strength directly.”
In so doing, the
Court bypassed ruling on the merits of the defendants’ underlying argument of whether strength is an appropriate measure by which to
gauge job ability.
More specifically, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the
disparate impact doctrine does not allow all strength measures to pass
the business necessity test in all situations. In Dothard, the Court presumed that Dianne Rawlinson, who physically dealt with prisoners on a
daily basis, needed to meet a minimum threshold of strength in order
to adequately perform her job duties. While this assumption was
Marshall’s dissent eloquently demonstrates that the majority’s reasoning “regrettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about women—that women, wittingly
or not, are seductive sexual objects.” Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 329-30 (majority opinion). While the defendants argued that the Court
should consider statistics based on actual applicants to the positions in question, the
Court accepted the plaintiffs’ nationwide population. Id. at 330-31.
60
Id. at 331.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 331-32.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 332.
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probably true in that particular case, it is not necessarily true in all
gender-related disparate impact cases. Consider, at the extremes, a
65
strength requirement for a high school English teacher, or a test requiring a minimum number of pushups for a job that involves long66
Such tests should fail—the former because the
distance walking.
English teacher does not need physical strength to perform his job
(lack of relationship between the skill and the job), and the latter because pushups are not the appropriate method with which to measure
aerobics (lack of relationship between the test and the required skill).
On a fundamental level, the disparate impact doctrine requires evidence of a clear correlation between the skill and the test (demonstrated by the English teacher example), and the test and the job
67
(demonstrated by the pushup example). If the Dothard Court had
stated that employers must statistically demonstrate that strength and
other broadly defined traits were related to the job at hand, and that the
test adequately reflected that trait, the Court could have then shown
how the employers in the case had (or had not) established these dual
requirements. Instead, the Court’s presumptive silence on this matter
has led to confusion in lower courts’ analyses of physical-selection pro68
cedure cases and has in this way stymied Dothard’s potential.
Dothard’s impact, as stated in later cases, has by and large been limited to three specific propositions: (1) gender is included in Title VII’s
enumerated list of protected classes, and the same disparate impact
standards used for race should also apply to gender-based disparate

65

Two race-related corollaries might be the literary tests in Albemarle and the general intelligence test in Griggs. In both cases, the Court held that the tests did not adequately correspond to the job duties of low-level workers at paper mills and coal plants,
respectively. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431-32 (1975); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
66
Cf. Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-22 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(concluding that a ladder-climbing test was a poor indicator of endurance and agility,
both of which were important when evaluating necessary skills in potential firefighters),
rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993).
67
See supra notes 19, 53 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The first part of the analysis, business necessity, ‘inquires whether the job criteria arise out of a manifest business need.’ . . . The
second part of the analysis, relatedness, ‘inquires whether there is a [statistically proven]
correlation between the criteria used and successful job performance.’” (quoting Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Me. 1994))).
68
See infra Section III.C.
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69

impact claims; (2) data from the actual applicant pool in question is
70
not always necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact;
and (3) height and weight restrictions cannot by themselves establish a
71
business necessity sufficient to rebut a disparate impact claim. While
these holdings have undoubtedly “strengthened the position of dispar72
ate impact plaintiffs,” disparate impact has not had nearly as much
effect on dismantling gender stratification as advocates had once so
73
forcefully predicted.
B. Gender-Based Disparate Impact in Lower Federal
and State Courts After Dothard
Gender-based disparate impact cases have had limited success since
Dothard. To be sure, a number of height and weight restrictions—
74
similar to those in Dothard—have been struck down by lower courts.
Yet novel claims outside of the traditional testing, patronage, and
75
promotion cases remain “few and far between.” For example, “no69

See, e.g., Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that in Dothard “the Supreme Court expressly extended Griggs to a case of sexual discrimination”).
70
See, e.g., Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman II ), 705 F.2d 584, 594 (2d Cir.
1983) (“Those who have been deterred by a discriminatory practice from applying for
employment are as much victims of discrimination as are actual applicants whom the
practice has caused to be rejected.”); LeBoeuf v. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747, 756 (D.
Mass. 1980) (using Dothard to support the assertion that “[g]eneralized national statistics, such as those offered by plaintiff here, will suffice to make out a prima facie case of
violation of Title VII”), rev’d sub nom. Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982).
This Comment references numerous decisions from the Berkman v. City of New York
litigation, which involved a Title VII disparate impact claim by female firefighter applicants against the New York City Fire Department in the 1980s. One Eastern District of
New York opinion (Berkman I ) and two Second Circuit opinions (Berkman II and Berkman IV ) will be discussed.
71
See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005 (1988) (“[A]bsent
proof that height and weight requirements directly correlate[] with amount of strength
deemed ‘essential to good job performance,’ [such] requirements [are] not justified as
business necessity.” (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977))).
72
Lye, supra note 19, at 326.
73
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
74
See, e.g., EEOC v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 743 F.2d 739, 741-43 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that a height requirement for the position of switchman-brakeman discriminated
against women); Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765, 769 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding
that height requirements illegally discriminated against female police officer applicants);
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1381-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a minimum
height requirement for applicants to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)).
75
Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
742-43 (2006). Professor Selmi’s research, which addresses all disparate impact claims,
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spouse” restrictions prohibiting spouses from working together have
on occasion been statistically proven to have an adverse impact on
76
women. However, such findings of disparate impact have rarely resulted in employer liability. As of 2006, only one federal court of appeals
77
had found a no-spouse claim viable under disparate impact theory.
Even pregnancy leave claims, once championed by feminist advo78
79
cates, have found only limited success in the courts. As Professor
Joanna Grossman recently opined, “The reality is that plaintiffs almost

and not just gender-related suits, also points to a significant overall decline in the success
rate of disparate impact litigation since 1985. Id. at 738.
76
See, e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a no-spouse rule had a disparate impact upon women and was not “justified by
business necessity”); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1977)
(determining that the no-spouse rule had a “substantial discriminatory impact,” as evidenced by the fact that “seventy-one of the last seventy-four people disqualified under it
were women”). But see Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir.
1987) (finding that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that an airline
company’s no-spouse restriction had a disparate impact on women); Harper v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412-14 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that the employee
failed to prove that a no-spouse policy adversely affected women).
Notably, married women have brought the “vast majority” of suits challenging nospouse policies, thus “mak[ing it] clear that antinepotism and no-spouse rules have a
disparate impact on women.” Timothy D. Chandler et al., Spouses Need Not Apply: The
Legality of Antinepotism and No-Spouse Rules, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 43, 69 (2002).
77
Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 237, 245
(2006). Professor Rabin-Margalioth finds the lack of successful no-spouse claims “surprising” because, “[a]lthough neutral on their face,” no-spouse restrictions “disproportionately affect the female partner in the relationship, whether upon the mutual
decision of the couple concerned or the unilateral decision of the employer.” Id.
78
See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON
L. REV. 1, 42 (1995) (“Disparate impact analysis can be used to resolve many of the accommodation problems faced by pregnant women.”); Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 942-43 (1985) (advocating for a recognition of pregnancy leave under the disparate impact theory).
79
See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2002)
(upholding a three-day pregnancy leave policy); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223
F.3d 579, 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a disparate impact challenge when a
pregnant employee was discharged); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314
(11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a disparate impact challenge to an employer’s practice of
only assigning light duty to officers injured on the job); EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass’n,
27 F.3d 292, 295-96 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding a leave policy that treated pregnant and
nonpregnant teachers equally); United States v. Bd. of Educ. of the Consol. High Sch.
Dist. 230, Palos Hills, Ill., 983 F.2d 790, 797-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding the maternal
leave policy over the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
730 F.2d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding, against a disparate impact claim, Delta’s
policy of shifting pregnant women to ground duty).
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never prevail on such claims in the pregnancy context.” Yet, one area
of gender-based disparate impact cases has found success in the courts:
physical-selection procedure cases.
III. A SUBSET OF SUCCESS: PHYSICAL-SELECTION PROCEDURE CASES
Discriminatory physical-selection procedure cases under the disparate impact theory serve as an excellent case study of both the potential and the limitations of the gender-based disparate impact doctrine.
These cases, which parallel race-based disparate impact cases involving
81
written examinations, feature female plaintiffs who challenge the use
of physical-selection procedures, such as weightlifting, push-ups, and
running, which act as entry barriers to traditionally male-dominated
82
jobs. Although the Supreme Court recently tackled written examina80

Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO.
L.J. 567, 616 (2010). In contrast to the limited breadth and depth of positive genderbased disparate impact case law, feminist advocacy literature encouraging the doctrine’s expansion has proliferated. Professor Michelle Travis, for example, has suggested using disparate impact theory to increase access to telecommuting. See Travis, supra
note 1, at 341-73. Joan Williams has asserted that advocates seeking to challenge “masculine social norms” in hiring and promoting should consider filing disparate impact
suits. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104-05 (2000). Lastly, Lara Gardner has introduced the idea of
using disparate impact claims to require employers to provide accommodation for
breastfeeding women. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 280-81.
81
See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-66 (2009); Guardians Ass’n of
the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 83-85, 106 (2d Cir.
1980); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 509, 513
(8th Cir. 1977).
82
In researching this Comment, I have attempted to compile a comprehensive list
of the physical-selection procedure cases litigated. Of the cases examined, courts in
eleven out of nineteen cases have struck down physical-selection procedures for their
disparate impact on women. See Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire
Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 471, 475 (2d Cir. 1999) (invalidating a test that “involved dragging
a water filled hose—weighing approximately 280 pounds—over a distance of 150 feet”);
Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 614, 618 (6th Cir. 1980) (invalidating a test that included push-ups, sit-ups, and a twenty-five-second obstacle course); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1381 n.14, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (invalidating a test that
involved running a total of fifty yards and scaling a six-foot wall); Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 342-44 (D. Conn. 2011) (invalidating a test that included a
timed one-and-a-half mile run); United States v. City of Erie, Pa., 411 F. Supp. 2d 524,
530, 571 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (invalidating a test consisting of an obstacle course, push-ups,
and sit-ups); Legault v. Russo, 842 F. Supp. 1479, 1482, 1489 (D.N.H. 1994) (invalidating a ladder-climb, hose-pull, and timed-run test); EEOC v. Simpson Timber Co., No.
89-1455, 1992 WL 420897, at *3-6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 7, 1992) (invalidating a weight-pull
test); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-22 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (invalidating a ladder-climb test), rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993); Thomas v.
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tions in Ricci, it has yet to rule on the validity of physical-selection procedures. Lower courts have issued conflicting opinions, both in the
83
84
standards applied and in the holdings reached. This Part will attempt to explain why some cases succeed while others do not.
To that end, this Part will identify the various points at which physical-selection procedure claims tend to break down. First, the majority
of cases appear to presume that physical-selection procedures have a
prima facie disparate impact on women and so proceed directly to an
85
analysis of the business necessity defense. This approach suggests
that courts do not view actual disparate impact evidence as an integral
component of the gender-based disparate impact narrative. Second,
some decisions point to the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately prepare for
86
exams, an analysis that is inconsistent with the Griggs holding. Third,
the dispositive issue in a majority of cases is the business necessity de87
fense. This Part argues that courts have misconstrued the spirit of this
defense as put forth in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991. Finally,
litigants struggle against claims that “strength is everything” and that

City of Evanston, 610 F. Supp. 422, 425, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (invalidating a stair-climb,
timed-run, and obstacle-course test); Burney v. City of Pawtucket, 559 F. Supp. 1089,
1099 & n.15, 1103 (D.R.I. 1983) (invalidating a test that included a body-fat measurement and a long jump); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 481 F. Supp. 1162, 1165
(E.D. Wis. 1979) (invalidating a requirement that paramedics pass a twelve-week firefighter training course).
Eight out of nineteen cases have upheld physical-selection procedures as valid under Title VII. See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning II ), 308 F.3d 286, 288 (3d
Cir. 2002) (validating a test that required applicants to run one-and-a-half miles in
twelve minutes); Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 213, 217-220 (6th Cir.
1990) (validating a test involving an overhead lift); Cleghorn v. Herrington, 813 F.2d
992, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (validating a physical-fitness test for security personnel in a
nuclear facility); Berkman II, 705 F.2d 584, 587, 590 n.5 (2d Cir. 1983) (validating a test
that included ladder raising and hose drags); Evans v. City of Evanston, 695 F. Supp.
922, 924, 928 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (validating a ladder-climb, hose-connect, and agilitycourse test), vacated, 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. City of Wichita Falls,
704 F. Supp. 709, 711, 715 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (validating an obstacle-course and dummydrag test); Eison v. City of Knoxville, 570 F. Supp. 11, 12-13 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (validating a test consisting of sit-ups, push-ups, squats, and a two-mile run); Hardy v. Stumpf,
576 P.2d 1342, 1343-44 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (validating a wall-scaling test).
83
For analysis of the various courts’ differing standards, see David E. Hollar, Physical Ability Tests and Title VII, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 785-93 (2000).
84
See supra note 82.
85
See infra Section III.A.
86
See infra Section III.B.
87
See infra Section III.C.
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“more is better,” stereotypical and anachronistic assumptions regard88
ing the traits needed to perform traditionally male occupations.
This Part suggests that the courts’ proclivities can largely be explained by their tendency to bypass the formal doctrine and instead
heed their own traditional assumptions about gender. Courts place
undue emphasis on arguments that should not be part of the disparate
impact discourse. Courts also rely on presumptions about an employer’s needs without critically analyzing the validity of these presumptions and the context in which they have developed. While it is likely
that some of these issues are not unique to gender-based disparate impact claims, it is not my intention to compare these physical-selection
cases to written-examination cases where race is at issue. It suffices to
say that it is helpful for all physical-selection procedure plaintiffs to
consider and be aware of the following common obstacles.
A. Absence of Disparate Impact Statistics
Under the traditional disparate impact analysis, the first issue typically addressed is the presence or absence of a statistically adverse impact on a protected class. The minimum threshold needed to establish
a disparate impact has been hotly contested, with plaintiffs and defend89
90
ants clashing over the “four-fifths rule,” the minimum sample size,
91
and the relevant labor market.
Yet practically all of the physicalselection procedure cases in the gender context have completely bypassed the issue of adverse impact. For example, in seven of the eight
88

See infra Section III.D.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2011) (stating that a selection rate “for any race, sex,
or ethnic group” that is less than eighty percent “of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact”); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
995 n.3 (1988) (describing the EEOC’s eighty-percent standard as having been “criticized on technical grounds” and characterizing it as no “more than a rule of thumb for
the courts”).
90
See, e.g., Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650, 657, 658 n.10 (1st
Cir. 1985) (concluding that “[w]here the size of the sample is small . . . the ‘four-fifths
rule’ is not an accurate test of discriminatory impact”).
91
See, e.g., EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 299-303 (7th Cir.
1991) (finding the use of Chicago as the “relevant labor market” inappropriate because
the varying levels of interest for the jobs at issue, based on commuting time and language preference, could not adequately be taken into account); Pina v. City of E. Providence, 492 F. Supp. 1240, 1246 (D.R.I. 1980) (determining that the use of the “general
population” as the relevant labor market was “proper” because firefighting is a skill that
“the general population may possess”).
89
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cases in which physical-selection procedures were validated, courts first
determined that a disparate impact existed but then found an appro92
priate business necessity. Indeed, most of the courts found the existence of a disparate impact as a matter of course and paid only scant
93
As
attention to the statistical support advanced by the plaintiffs.
such, “disparate impact” as a statistical inquiry has been noticeably
absent from physical-selection procedure cases.
Plaintiffs’ attempts to introduce the stark discrepancies in hiring
rates often fail to persuade. In Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman IV ),
for example, a total of seven women placed in the top 15,316 applicants
94
on a physical-abilities test. Most courts disclose the statistics in their
opinions but nevertheless find that business necessity justifies the employer’s discriminatory practices. These courts quickly shuttle through
95
the statistical analyses, so painstakingly put together by previous courts,
en route to more “meaningful” analyses. It seems that courts are more
interested in analyzing the qualities of the job in question than the sta96
tistics that substantiated the adverse impact claim in the first place.
92

See supra note 82 for a list and description of these cases. The only exception to
this pattern is Eison v. City of Knoxville in which the plaintiff claimed that a physicalqualification test had a disparate impact on female applicants to the police force. 570
F. Supp. 11, 12 (E.D. Tenn. 1983). If the plaintiff’s specific test class from 1982 had
been analyzed separately, it would have fallen below the “four-fifths rule.” Id. at 13.
However, the court found that a proper analysis should include all applicants who took
the same test throughout the years of its administration; thus, the court found “no adverse impact on women.” Id.
93
In the Lanning I litigation, for example, the district court devoted only five “findings of law” in determining that a prima facie case of disparate impact existed. Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. 97-0593, 97-1161, 1998 WL 341605, at *55 (E.D. Pa.
June 25, 1998), vacated, 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999). However, it devoted sixty-five
“findings of law” to the question of whether defendants had a proper business necessity
defense. Id. at *55-70. Likewise, in United States v. City of Wichita Falls, the court devoted
only several sentences to the analysis of statistical adverse impact. 704 F. Supp. 709, 712
(N.D. Tex. 1988). As it hastily continued, “However, simply because a test has an adverse
impact under the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on a minority group does not mean that
the test necessarily is discriminatory.” Id.
94
812 F.2d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1987).
95
See supra Part I.
96
In fact, in light of the Court’s decision in Ricci, there may be even more at stake
in achieving a comprehensive doctrinal framework for the statistical analyses surrounding disparate impact. The Ricci Court held that an employer is liable for overturning
test results unless it can demonstrate that it had a strong evidentiary basis that certifying
such results would result in its losing a disparate impact action. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 267677 (2009). While the implications of this holding remain debated, Joseph Seiner and
Benjamin Gutman have argued that Ricci creates an affirmative defense if the defendants can prove they did not know the practice would have an unlawful disparate impact.
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B. Failure to Train
One common pitfall encountered in physical-selection procedure
cases is the sufficiency of the claimants’ training and preparation. A
number of physical-selection procedure cases, including the Third
Circuit’s Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
97
decisions (Lanning I and II ), added a new component to the disparate impact narrative: an adequate preparation requirement. In Lanning I and II, female plaintiffs challenged the use of a physical-fitnessscreening test that required applicants to run one-and-a-half miles with98
in twelve minutes. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) conceded that the test produced a disparate impact on
women as 55.6% of male applicants passed the test, compared to 6.7%
99
of female applicants. Finding that SEPTA had not shown that its fitness-test cutoff score measured “the minimum qualifications necessary
for successful performance of the job in question,” the Third Circuit in
100
Lanning I reversed the district court’s ruling for the defendants.
However, Judge Weis’s dissent developed an interesting argument:
he pointed out that “nearly all women who trained for [the running
101
test] were able to pass.”
Videotapes revealed that plaintiff Cathy
Lanning had walked for a portion of the test, demonstrating what
102
Judge Weis deemed a “‘cavalier’ attitude towards the running test.”
The lack of training proved crucial to Judge Weis’s analysis of the case:
Here, where applicants have it within their power to prepare for the running test, they may properly be expected to do so. In view of the important public safety concerns at issue, it is not unreasonable to expect

Seiner & Gutman, supra note 4, at 2204. Thus, under this framework, the statistical
analysis of whether a disparate impact exists would be relevant not only for a plaintiff’s
prima facie case but also for a defendant’s affirmative defense. It may be even more
important for potential litigators and defendants to understand what exactly a “disparate impact” looks like in the first instance.
97
See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning II ), 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002);
Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I ), 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
98
Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 288; Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 481-83.
99
Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 483.
100
Id. at 494. The Third Circuit remanded the case and instructed the district
court to reassess SEPTA’s business necessity defense under this “minimum qualifications” standard. Id.
101
Id. at 495 (Weis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102
Id.
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all applicants—female or male—to take the necessary steps in order to
103
qualify for the positions.

Despite Ms. Lanning’s affidavit describing her diligent preparation
104
for the test, and despite her subsequent successful career with the
105
University of Pennsylvania Police Department’s tactical bicycle unit,
Judge Weis was not convinced.
When the case reached the court of appeals for the second time,
the majority incorporated portions of Judge Weis’s Lanning I dissent
into its decision. In “one final note,” the court stated the following:
While it is undisputed that SEPTA’s 1.5 mile run test has a disparate impact on women, it is also undisputed that, in addition to those women who
could pass the test without training, nearly all the women who trained
were able to pass after only a moderate amount of training. It is not, we
think, unreasonable to expect that women—and men—who wish to become SEPTA transit officers, and are committed to dealing with issues of
106
public safety on a day-to-day basis, would take this necessary step.

Given this language, it is unclear whether the court intended to
make training part of the prima facie analysis—a possible limitation on
the use of actual statistics to prove a prima facie adverse impact—or
some sort of affirmative defense against “cavalier” plaintiffs, or a mere
chastisement, in dicta, of the plaintiffs’ lack of effort.
Lanning II is not the only case that has made reference to a plaintiff’s failure to train. Another gender-based disparate impact case,
Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman IV ), has also alluded to the training aspect. In that case, plaintiffs were given the opportunity to participate in a special training program for women in preparation for a
107
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the test
physical-abilities test.
had a disparate impact, the court noted in passing that many of the
female applicants had refused this training, and that the training had
proven effective for those female applicants who did participate in the
103

Id. at 501. In fact, SEPTA’s brief described how Ms. Lanning “ran a portion of
the course with her hands in her pockets.” Brief for Appellee Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority at 9, Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478 (Nos. 98-1644, 98-1755), 1999
WL 33617177.
104
See Brief for Appellants Lanning et al. at 58, Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478 (Nos. 981644, 98-1755), 1998 WL 34085350 (“Officer Lanning paid to attend a police academy.
When she trained to pass the SEPTA run, she developed a 1.5 mile course, practiced
running it on a routine basis, and timed herself as she ran.”).
105
Id. at 31.
106
Lanning II, 308 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2002).
107
Berkman IV, 812 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1987).
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108

program.
Failure-to-train language has also made its way into racebased disparate impact decisions. In its Ricci decision, for example,
the Supreme Court mentioned in dicta that a possible argument in
favor of certifying the New Haven test results might stem from the fact
109
As one
that the test was easy to pass if the candidate had studied.
firefighter candidate explained, “[e]very one” of the questions on the
written examination “came from the [study] material. . . . [I]f you read
the materials and you studied the material, you would have done well
110
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that access to
on the test.”
111
such study materials “fell at least in part along racial lines.”
Other
lower court decisions addressing the validity of written examinations
112
have also discussed the potential impact of failure to study.
This failure-to-train branch of thought has been coined “contribu113
tory” disparate impact theory by some scholars.
Professor Peter
Siegelman, for example, has advocated for a new affirmative defense
that would exculpate defendants “if they can show that plaintiffs seeking
to establish disparate impact liability failed to make reasonable efforts to
114
meet the job requirement being challenged.” While contributory dis-

108

Id. at 55, 62. The court, however, did not ultimately rely on this rationale. Instead, it focused on the business necessity affirmative defense. Id. at 59-60.
109
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (2009).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 2693 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112
See, e.g., Perry v. Orange Cnty., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
(arguing that one of the plaintiffs “should have been excluded from the disparate impact analysis” because, among other things, she did not purchase the test preparation
materials for the fire department promotion exam); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 544
F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“[T]he [written] test does not improperly impact
upon blacks, but instead the low test score resulted from lack of study.”), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, No. 771706, 1977 WL 15509, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1977) (holding that because the plaintiffs “did not attempt to seriously perform well” on their accounting exams there was
not an “adverse effect on Spanish surnamed persons”), aff’d, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.
1981). Contreras, at least, can be distinguished from Ricci because it involved an unusually small sample size and a group of professional accountants. See 1977 WL 15509, at *5
(“The Senior Accountant plaintiffs are trained specialists in the accounting profession
who have pursued their chosen work for a substantial length of time. . . . Their qualifications to pass a multiple choice test should be substantially greater than minority applicants seeking to be firemen.”).
113
See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimination Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515, 515 (2007).
114
Id. at 520; see also Laya Sleiman, Note, A Duty To Make Reasonable Efforts and a Defense of the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2677, 2682 (2004) (“The theory of disparate impact can thus be strengthened and
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parate impact theory is “far from well-established,” Professor Charles
Sullivan has predicted that “the extension of the theory to all races and
115
both genders may lead more courts to explore this approach.”
The problem with Lanning II, and especially a contributory negligence disparate impact theory, is that it is simply unsupported by the
disparate impact paradigm. The current framework of disparate impact
centers on three specific questions. First, is there an adverse impact on
a protected class? Second, is there a business necessity for this adverse
impact? Third, is there an alternative procedure that will satisfy the employer’s needs without having an adverse impact on these individuals?
It is far from clear which of these questions would be answered by a
plaintiff’s failure to train. It certainly is not relevant to the prima facie
case, as the Court has already held that disparate impact can be demon116
strated without actual applicant pool statistics, and thus a focus on
actual plaintiffs is unwarranted. And it seems even less relevant to a
question of business necessity or alternative methods.
More broadly, failure-to-train theories attempt to bring to light the
fact that applicant preparation, and not the test itself, was the “actual”
cause of the disparate impact. Yet it has been made abundantly clear
that disparate impact discrimination focuses on the consequences of employment practices, and the presence of an alternative predicating fac117
tor cannot excuse a discriminatory test.
It does not matter whether
the disparate impact was caused by the bad faith of employers, lack of
applicant preparation, or a poorly designed entrance examination;
118
As the
what is critical in the prima facie case is the impact itself.
Ninth Circuit explained in Bouman v. Block,

made more defensible if it is improved to allow for recovery only when plaintiffs have
put forth reasonable efforts . . . to comply with an employer’s hiring criteria.”).
115
Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1563 (2004).
116
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (“There is no requirement . . . that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must always be based on
analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants.”).
117
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“Congress directed
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”); EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1995)
(“Discrimination may . . . result from otherwise neutral policies and practices that, when
actuated in real-life settings, operate to the distinct disadvantage of certain classes of
individuals.”).
118
As discussed earlier, courts do not spend much time discussing the actual prima
facie case in physical-selection procedure cases. See supra Section III.A. In light of these
tendencies, it is important for plaintiffs to contextualize their arguments, urging con-
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After all, the whole point of a disparate impact challenge is that a facially
non-discriminatory employment or promotion device—in this case an
examination—has a discriminatory effect. It would be odd indeed if a defendant whose facially non-discriminatory examination which has a disparate impact could escape the obligation to validate the examination
merely by pointing to some other facially non-discriminatory factor that
119
correlates with the disparate impact.

Consider the impact of a failure-to-train analysis on the landmark
Griggs case—should those plaintiffs have been condemned for not studying hard enough? Would the plaintiffs who had not adequately prepared for the GED exam be excluded from statistics establishing a
disparate impact? In Griggs, the Supreme Court noted that the African
American plaintiffs were more likely to fail aptitude tests because, as
compared to whites, they had received “inferior education in segregated
120
Plaintiffs’ lack of education was an alternative predicating
schools.”
factor to their low passage rate on the test in question, but that fact did
121
not preclude the Court from finding a disparate impact. If an alternative predicating factor could undermine a prima facie case, then even
122
the landmark Griggs case might have been decided differently.
Introduction of preparation and training evidence should not be
taken lightly; it is highly prejudicial and panders to the stereotype that
women are weak, both in body and in will, and the perception that
123
hard-working men lose their jobs due to the “preferential treatment”
of women who fail to meet the bare minimum of expectations. In fact,
sideration of historical deprivation as well as actual doctrinal application. See infra Sections IV.A and IV.D.
119
940 F.2d 1211, 1228 (9th Cir. 1991).
120
401 U.S. at 430.
121
See id. at 436 (“What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”); see also Stagi v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 671, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“[T]he existence of some
ultimate cause for which the employer is not legally responsible cannot defeat a plaintiff’s
prima facie case.”); Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 937 F. Supp. 1397, 1410
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that “[d]efendants cannot escape liability by showing that the
disparate impact is attributable to particular background factors” such as lack of English
language skills and lack of education), aff’d, 183 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1999).
122
Interestingly, the only Supreme Court decision on gender-based disparate impact, Dothard v. Rawlinson, would not have been changed by performing a failure-totrain analysis, because Dothard held that certain statutory height and weight requirements—that is, traits that are indisputably beyond a person’s control—violated Title
VII. 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977). As discussed earlier, Dothard did not extend its reasoning to strength requirements, perhaps further underscoring the weak posture of the
Dothard decision. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
123
Grossman, supra note 80, at 617.
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there may be an evidentiary basis upon which to exclude such argu124
ments as irrelevant to the disparate impact framework, as they have
no place in current prima facie analysis and are even less appropriate
125
in discussing job relatedness and alternative methods.
The courts’
consideration of such evidence is another obstacle faced by genderbased disparate impact litigants.
C. The Catchall Business Necessity Defense
The business necessity affirmative defense is the doctrinal grave126
Due to the lack of
yard for gender-based disparate impact claims.
127
clarity in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the silence of the Supreme
Court, and the consequent inconsistency of appellate court stand128
ards, judges have exercised considerable discretion in deciding how
124

The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude all evidence that is not relevant. FED. R.
EVID. 402; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining “relevant evidence” as “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).
Additionally, Rule 403 excludes even relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentapresentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
125
Professor Siegelman has argued that courts should create a new affirmative defense for defendants who can prove that plaintiffs failed to train for their test. See supra
notes 113-14 and accompanying text. While that is certainly possible, none of the decisions discussed above has established this affirmative defense in so many words and thus
it remains a tentative recommendation at best. However, establishing a failure-to-train
defense is overly complicated and unnecessary. First, most plaintiffs already have a
non–litigation-related incentive for training: passing the test. Second, while it is relatively easy to train for a timed run, other physical-selection procedure tests require
more strenuous preparation. See, e.g., Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp. 1214,
1220 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (describing a test that involved a five-story ladder climb), rev’d
on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993). Mandating that applicants train adequately
for these tests (or, alternatively, allowing defendants to escape liability by proving that
applicants did not train) extends an advantage to those with the resources to do so.
126
Indeed, the eight cases studied in this Comment that resulted in selectionprocedure validation all found a legitimate business necessity in their particular set of
facts. See supra note 82.
127
See Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1993) (“[T]he Act is so ambiguous, and leaves so many
major questions unanswered, that it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty
what its impact will be other than to delay and complicate litigation for the foreseeable
future.”).
128
See Hollar, supra note 83, at 785 (“Because the Supreme Court precedent is so
confusing and the terms ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ are seemingly redundant,
lower courts have struggled to articulate a rule for analyzing physical test cases.”). Hollar summarizes four major standards that have emerged for evaluating physical-abilities
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129

to administer this defense.
For advocates hoping to expand the
gender-based disparate impact doctrine, this discretion has proven to
be more of a curse than a blessing. Indeed, the business necessity doctrine has become a sort of catchall that legitimizes the court’s intuitive
reluctance to invalidate discriminatory selection procedures.
Doctrinally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the business necessity defense, allowing employers to escape Title VII liability if they
can prove “that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
130
question and consistent with business necessity.”
Thus, the affirmative defense analysis essentially focuses on two different, but related,
questions. First, the defendant must establish sufficient job validity: is
the skill being tested actually necessary for satisfactory job perfor131
mance? Second, the defendant must prove sufficient content validi132
ty: is the test in place actually related to this skill?
Consider again the height and weight requirements at issue in
Dothard. The Dothard Court rejected the requirements because the
defendants had failed to produce evidence “correlating the height and
weight requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought
133
essential to good job performance.”
That is, the Court found that
this particular test (the height and weight requirement) was not substantially reflective of the skill needed (strength). Thus, the employer’s
test in Dothard failed due to its lack of content validity. The defendant
also bore the burden of proving that strength was a business necessity
for the job in question—that is, its job validity. Strength is not per se
important to every occupation, but Dothard failed to clarify this point.
tests under Title VII: (1) the manifest-relationship test; (2) the public-safety doctrine;
(3) the close-approximation-to-job-tasks approach; and (4) the minimum-qualifications
requirement. Id. at 785-93.
129
Notably, even the least deferential standards have resulted in sustaining business
necessity defenses. See, e.g., Lanning II, 308 F.3d 286, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying
the minimum-qualifications test). And even the most lenient standards have resulted
in the rejection of the defense. See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616 n.6 (6th Cir.
1980) (employing the manifest-relationship test).
130
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
131
See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Graffam v. Scott Paper
Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 400 (D. Me. 1994) (requiring an inquiry into “whether the job
criteria arise out of a manifest business need”).
132
See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (“What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of
job performance.”); Graffam, 870 F. Supp. at 400 (requiring an inquiry into “whether
there is a correlation between the criteria used and successful job performance”).
133
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
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Most courts have adopted a single standard to deal with both con134
The consequence of this approach is
tent validity and job validity.
that the question of job analysis is at best conflated with that of content analysis and at worst completely overlooked. In Hardy v. Stumpf,
for example, the California Supreme Court examined the validity of a
physical-performance test for Oakland’s police force that required an
135
applicant to scale a six-foot wall. In finding that the test was justified
by business necessity, the court pointed to the fact that the test re136
As the court
quired applicants to perform a necessary job skill.
quipped, “Surely, it is difficult to imagine a more accurate way of test137
ing ability to scale a six-foot wall than to scale one.”
Likewise, in Evans v. City of Evanston, the plaintiff challenged a pretraining physical-screening test for becoming a firefighter that required applicants to climb an aerial ladder, drag hoses, and walk
138
through ten tires while carrying a tarp, all within a fixed time period.
The defendant’s test creators consulted at least two “experts in fire139
fighting” to ensure the screening test simulated on-the-job tasks.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the test “was constructed without an effort to quantify the physiological requirements
140
of the job of [a] firefighter.” The court reasoned:
Under [the plaintiff’s] theory, one might say of the typist that he or she
needs hand and finger speed, and coordination, eye control and the capacity for sustained concentration; and the best way to test these is to
measure the physiological requirements of each of these elements in typing and then apply appropriate tests for each. All this rather than ask the
141
candidate to sit and type.

Despite a male passage rate of over ninety percent and a female
passage rate of less than sixteen percent, the court—citing the similarity
134

Hollar, supra note 83, at 794.
576 P.2d 1342, 1343-44 (Cal. 1978) (en banc). The wall-scaling test was specifically
devised because, by law, Oakland fences could be no more than six feet. Id. at 1345.
136
See id. (“The record clearly establishes a reasonable relationship between the physical performance test—particularly the six-foot wall climb—and job performance.”).
137
Id. at 1347.
138
695 F. Supp. 922, 923-24 (N.D. Ill. 1988), vacated, 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989).
The City of Evanston set its cut-off time for passing the test at one standard deviation
above the mean, which typically allowed about eighty-four percent of the applicant
pool to pass. Id. at 929. The district court ultimately held that the time limitation was
unreasonable. Id.
139
Id. at 924.
140
Id. at 927-28.
141
Id. at 927.
135
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between the components of the test and the requirements of the job—
142
validated the test.
The Evans and Hardy courts seemed to find it intuitive that a test
replicating a job-related skill should be validated, and they conse143
quently dismissed alternative tests for falling short of the ideal. Had
these courts performed a two-step analysis, however, they might have
understood the problem: the accuracy of the test is dependent on
144
what it is trying to measure. If the point of the test is to establish the
applicant’s ability to perform one specific task (in Hardy, the applicant’s ability to scale a wall), then the test is certainly a valid indicator
of that particular skill. However, the defendant would then need to
prove that the wall-scaling skill is substantially related to the job at
145
For example, the defendant might be required to introduce
hand.
evidence of the number of times wall-scaling is actually performed by
the average police officer.
Alternatively, if the point of the test is to determine the applicant’s
general physical fitness, rather than the applicant’s wall-climbing ability,
then the job-relatedness issue would be easily established. After all,
some level of physical fitness is without question an important aspect
146
of a police officer’s job. However, the defendant would still need to
prove that the examination was an appropriate test for measuring physical fitness. In this alternative, the fact that the test is closely related to
147
To
an actual job responsibility is confounding and likely irrelevant.
continue with the analogy used in Evans, rejecting a test that asked a
142

Id. at 925, 928.
Id. at 925; Hardy v. Stumpf, 576 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Cal. 1978).
144
The EEOC has established three types of validity: criterion, content, and construct. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A) (2011). All three types relate to this general point.
For definitions of these validities, see supra note 53.
145
The standard necessary to determine a substantial relationship between the skill
and the job will vary by jurisdiction. See supra note 128. In Harless v. Duck, for instance,
the Sixth Circuit found under the lenient “manifest relationship” standard that a test
must present concrete evidence of the “amount” of the certain skill needed. 619 F.2d
611, 616 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1980). Applying this rationale in Hardy, a defendant would
need to demonstrate an appropriate “amount” of wall-scaling to justify that component
of the job-application test.
146
See Harless, 619 F.2d at 616 (“Undoubtedly, police officers must meet certain
physical standards to be capable of performing their jobs safely and effectively.”).
147
See, e.g., Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 F. Supp. 2d 323, 340-41 (D. Conn. 2011)
(explaining that the mile-and-a-half run required for becoming a corrections officer
(CO) “was only meant to measure aerobic capacity” and that while “[a]erobic capacity
is a prerequisite to a number of activities a CO might have to perform . . . [r]unning
itself [was] not a close approximation to the typical duties of a CO”).
143
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typist to type may not seem as absurd if the overall skill being tested
were the ability to manage an office.
Moreover, both Evans and Hardy merely required the test as a pre148
screening device prior to entering a training academy.
In other
words, following this selection procedure, applicants were sent to a
training academy to ensure that they learned the required skills. The
relevant analogy is thus not a typist being tested on her ability to type,
but rather a typist being denied entrance into a training school because
of her inability, at that precise moment, to type fast enough. In fact,
the EEOC regulations specifically instruct employers to “avoid making
employment decisions on the basis of measures of knowledges, skills,
or abilities which are normally learned in a brief orientation period,
149
and which have an adverse impact.”
It may be that, even under this doctrinal analysis, defendants will
ultimately demonstrate that tests that accurately assess job-related responsibilities also sufficiently reflect a skill that is necessary for job performance. Using this two-step process, however, will help displace some
of the adjudicator’s tendencies to appeal to her own intuitions of how
150
things ought to be. It will force the defendant to provide more than
just simple assertions of gut feelings or repetitions of the status quo.
Most importantly, it will reorient the conversation to focus on the
Griggs disparate impact doctrine.

148

In fact, studies have shown that “[w]omen benefit greatly from training because
most tests have a significant skill component which can readily be taught.” Ruth
Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for Traditionally Male Occupations as
Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 803 (1986). In Berkman v. City of New York (Berkman I ), one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses testified that
for selection procedures, “what must be identified are not those who are strongest or
fastest but, instead, those who, with the benefit of training in pacing . . . can perform
the punishing tasks of firefighting as they are actually required to be performed.” 536
F. Supp. 177, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). These witnesses also testified that “firefighting takes
its toll, not as a result of failures of maximum strength or speed, even at critical moments, but rather through the physical demands extending over long periods of time
which necessitate paced performance at less-than-maximum levels.” Id.
149
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(F).
150
At least one court has written approvingly of the two-step inquiry, though the
court itself did not follow this approach. See Easterling, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (“A second viable interpretation of the foregoing precedent is that determining whether a
hiring practice is ‘job related and consistent with business necessity’ is a two-step inquiry.” (emphasis added)).
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D. “Strength Is Not Always Everything,” and
“More Is Not Always Better”
Plaintiffs in physical-selection procedure cases struggle against at
least two other stereotypical assumptions regarding female applicants
that undermine the Supreme Court case law as put forth in Griggs and
its progeny. First, plaintiffs must combat the assumption that occupations requiring physical exertion, such as firefighting and policing, must
necessarily involve only such traditional physical traits as speed, size, and
151
strength. This “strength is everything” assumption has been repeat152
edly questioned by historical anecdotes and personal testimony.
Some male SEPTA officers interviewed in the process of the Lanning I
and II litigation, for example, stated that it was their experience that
when arresting male perpetrators, sometimes a female officer could de153
Indeed, the
escalate the situation better than a male officer could.
defendants were unable to produce any evidence at trial suggesting
that they had ever taken disciplinary action against an officer because
154
she could not perform the physical aspects of her job.
Similarly, courts often make the assumption that in terms of physical skill, “more is better.” Under this theory, physical-abilities tests
should be scored on a rank-order basis rather than simply pass or
155
fail.
In 1979, Brenda Berkman challenged the New York City Fire
Department’s rank-order entrance examination for its adverse impact
151

Colker, supra note 148, at 776-79.
See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1379 n.7 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“Shorter officers may have certain advantages in observing field situations (e.g., the ability to look under objects, the ability to squeeze through narrow passageways) that taller
officers lack.”); David Holmstrom, Women Officers Arrest the Gender Gap, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2000, at 11, 14 (asserting that women may improve police forces due
to their ability to resolve neighborhood and family disputes as well as other problems).
153
E-mail from Lisa Rau, Att’y of Record for Lanning I & II to author (Oct. 12,
2011, 11:37 AM) (on file with author). It should be noted, however, that this was not a
position advanced by Rau or any other counsel for the Lanning I and II plaintiffs. Rather, this belief “was what was reported by experienced male transit police officers. The Lanning Plaintiffs did not assert that they would be better than their male
police officer counterparts but simply that they should be not be discriminated against
in hiring when they were fully qualified to do the job.” Id.
154
Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1999). According to the plaintiff’s brief on
appeal, the defendants were unable to demonstrate in the court below that any officer
provided inadequate backup assistance due to an inability to run a mile and a half in
twelve minutes. Brief for Appellants Lanning et al., supra note 104, at 2. SEPTA discontinued the use of the contested running test in the fall of 2009. Telephone Interview with David Scott, Deputy Chief, SEPTA Transit Police Dep’t (Nov. 23, 2011).
155
See, e.g., Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 493-94 nn. 22-23.
152
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156

on female applicants.
Initially, the Department did not attempt to
perform any content or job validity. Instead, it justified the rank-order
with the “obvious” conclusion “that every increment in the abilities
tested for in its physical exam necessarily represents a better perfor157
The district court rejected this argument
mance as a firefighter.”
and noted that “rank-ordering should be used only if it can be shown
158
that a higher score . . . is likely to result in better job performance.”
Here, the physical tasks measured by the entrance exam were not representative of actual tasks performed by firefighters because they required candidates to perform the tasks anaerobically, while firefighters
159
in the field use both anaerobic and aerobic skills simultaneously.
160
Basing its conThe Second Circuit nevertheless validated the test.
clusion partially on “self-evident” intuitions, the Second Circuit found
that “the Fire Department is entitled to select those who are endowed
with the physical abilities to act effectively in the first moments of arrival at a fire scene, where immediate speed and strength literally con161
cern matters of life and death.”
The two stereotypes apparent in Berkman and Lanning reflect a
“nested doll” problem: unfounded assumptions are nested within
each other, and a victory that peels away one assumption (that “more
is better”) reveals yet another assumption (that applicants who are
naturally “endowed” aerobically will be more effective “in the first
156

Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. 177, 179, 204-05 (E.D.N.Y 1982). Prior to applying to
become a firefighter, Brenda Berkman—a marathon runner—trained diligently for the
physical-performance examination by doing things like chopping wood and “carry[ing]
[her] husband up and down the stairs of [their] apartment building.” Brenda Berkman, Remarks at The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law
Event: “Taking the Heat: Gender Discrimination in Firefighting” (Oct. 21, 2008), in
Taking the Heat, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 713, 720 (2009). At the time
Berkman applied, “The New York City Fire Department had more than 11,000 firefighters . . . [and] not one was a female.” Richard Ugelow, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll.
Of Law, Remarks at The American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law
Event: “Taking the Heat: Gender Discrimination in Firefighting” (Oct. 21, 2008), in
Taking the Heat, supra, at 717.
157
Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. at 211.
158
Id. at 210 (alteration in original) (quoting Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police
Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 100 (2d Cir. 1980)). The Second Circuit
in Guardians held that “it is reasonable to insist that the test measure important aspects
of the job.” 630 F.2d at 99.
159
Susan T. Epstein, Women in the Firehouse: The Second Circuit Upholds a GenderBiased Firefighters’ Examination, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 511, 523 (1988).
160
Berkman IV, 812 F.2d 52, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1987).
161
Id. at 59. Rank-order tests have also been held valid in Cleveland. See Zamlen v.
City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 220 (6th Cir. 1990).
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162

moments of arrival at the scene of a fire” ). In order to transcend
these stereotypes, then, advocates must confront each assumption
head on. For example, in challenging the “more is better” assumption, Professor Ruth Colker has asserted that the job analysis under163
taken to substantiate rank-order tests often does not include women.
As she argues, “In order to assess whether a test is valid on a rankorder basis it is crucial to include women in the job analysis. To date
164
[1986], no job analysis has included female participants.” Advocates
must demonstrate that by relying on these analyses, courts base a business necessity defense on a set of data—here the job analysis—that is
itself a product of stereotypes. Relying on this type of analysis defeats
the very purpose of disparate impact theory.
IV. BEST PRACTICES FOR GENDER-BASED
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
Because roughly half the physical-selection procedure cases studied
in this Comment have resulted in the judicial validation of the test in
165
question, the sample lends itself to a comparison between the cases
that have invalidated tests and those that have not. I have identified
four best practices that have proven beneficial in the physical-selection
procedure realm and that may also be applicable to gender-based disparate impact cases in general.
First, an advocate should contextualize the problem at hand. Since
a vast majority of physical-selection procedure plaintiffs seek positions
in traditionally male occupations, contextualizing the industry as such
will give the factfinder a narrative in which to frame the litigation. Second, an advocate should appeal to the factfinder’s capacity to dismiss
unfounded stereotypes. This can be achieved by calling as witnesses
female applicants who failed the test in question but ultimately proved
to be skilled and successful in their jobs. Third, an advocate should

162

Berkman IV, 812 F.2d at 59.
Colker, supra note 148, at 798; see also Easterling v. Connecticut, 783 F. Supp. 2d
323, 328 (D. Conn. 2011) (“The plaintiff has presented expert testimony that
the . . . percentile rankings used by the [Department of Corrections] were based on
measurements from a sample of women who possessed a higher level of fitness than the
overall female population.”); Brief for Appellants Lanning et al., supra note 104, at 48
(arguing that because SEPTA’s simulation included only five percent of women, this
fact “increases the necessary scrutiny” given to the test and the design procedure).
164
Colker, supra note 148, at 798.
165
See supra note 82.
163
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address valid concerns by providing concrete examples of effective
alternative-selection procedures from other municipalities. Presenting
such reasonable alternatives can help the factfinder overcome public
safety concerns. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an advocate
should consistently refer back to the purpose and intent of the disparate
impact cause of action, emphasizing its stated neutrality and its consequent potential for social change.
A. Contextualize the Test and the Industry
To understand the discourse surrounding physical-selection procedures, it is informative to review the tradition of exclusion faced by
women seeking to enter the law enforcement and firefighting professions. In many major cities, women were not permitted to apply for certain positions within police forces or firefighting squads until the
166
1970s. Indeed, the City of New York did not open its firefighter appli167
cant exam to women until 1977.
When women were eventually allowed into these professions, they were relegated to second-class status.
For example, Los Angeles policewomen were barred from regular police patrol duty, generally performed “tasks relating to women and
children, desk duty, and administration,” and were ineligible for pro168
motion above sergeant. Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the obstacles faced by women in traditionally male professions; for example, in United States v. Virginia, the Court noted that “women seeking careers in policing [have] encountered resistance based on fears
that their presence would . . . deprive male partners of adequate assis169
tance . . . . Field studies [do] not confirm these fears.”
While this historical discrimination is not in and of itself a factor in
disparate impact analysis, it provides an essential context in which to
explain subsequent actions taken by city employers and testmakers.
Simply put, physical-selection procedures are often used in jobs where
it is still a “man’s world,” and this correlation is not a coincidence.
When an industry consists of an overwhelming majority of men, then
men are more likely to be in hiring and supervisory positions, and—
166

See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining that the LAPD excluded entry-level policewomen from regular patrol work
until 1973).
167
Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. 177, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
168
Blake, 595 F.2d at 1371.
169
518 U.S. 515, 544 (1996) (citing FRANCES HEIDENSOHN, WOMEN IN CONTROL?
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 92-93, 184-85 (1992)).
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consciously or subconsciously—they are more likely to base their
standards of success around the manner in which men traditionally
170
perform these jobs. They will likely be less understanding of how the
job can be performed equally well in alternative manners. Because of
the lack of internal pressure to adapt, courts should examine maledominated occupations critically and vigilantly, looking out for deci171
sions made on the basis of unfounded assumptions.
Using this lens, courts will find much about which to be suspicious.
In Berkman I, a proposed test that considered an applicant’s flexibility
was rejected because the fire department wanted a test “for firefight172
ers, not for ballet dancers.” More recently, the employer in Lanning
I and II hired a test developer who had previously been criticized by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia for his overtly stereotypical categorizations of women and the impact on all-male institutions if
173
When asked rhetorically at a deposiwomen were to be admitted.
170

See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1980) (invalidating a test
developed through an “intuitive process”); Brunet v. City of Columbus, 642 F. Supp.
1214, 1249 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (rejecting “anecdotal evidence” as insufficient to validate
a test), rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993).
171
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of including members of the
group who are disparately excluded in studies that are used to validate tests. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435-36 (1975) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5(b)(1),
(b)(5) (1974)).
172
Berkman I, 536 F. Supp. 177, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
173
The expert in question, Dr. Paul Davis, testified extensively on the point that because of physiological differences between men and women, “[f]emale cadets would
not be able to perform the tasks in the [Virginia Military Institute (VMI)] rat training
program at a level comparable to that of male cadets,” that women would reduce the
“intensity and aggressiveness of the current program,” and that as a result, “[t]he program’s benefit to the morale of male participants would be adversely affected.” United
States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1438 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th
Cir. 1992), aff’d, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). When United States v. Virginia eventually reached
the Supreme Court, the United States countered Davis’s testimony by arguing that
“time and again since this Court’s turning point decision in Reed v. Reed, [this Court
has] cautioned reviewing courts to take a ‘hard look’ at generalizations or ‘tendencies’
of the kind pressed by Virginia.” 518 U.S. at 541 (citation omitted). The Court agreed,
finding that
[t]he notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI’s stature, destroy
the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a judgment hardly
proved, a prediction hardly different from other ‘self-fulfilling prophec[ies],’
once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities. When women first sought
admission to the bar and access to legal education, concerns of the same order
were expressed.
Id. at 542-43 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Miss.
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)); see also Charles J. Russo & Susan J.
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tion if there were any physical activities in which women’s abilities exceeded those of men, Dr. Davis responded affirmatively—women are
174
better, he allowed, at “having children and giving milk.”
Proving test-developer bias, or inadequate content analysis prior to
the application of the test, cannot invalidate a test if the analysis performed ex post ultimately substantiates the examination. Nevertheless, understanding the context may support the argument that courts
should examine these decisions more critically in light of the fact that
test developers are likely not to have undertaken such analysis themselves. As Judge O’Hern noted in his In re Vey dissent, when a woman
is excluded from a traditionally “male” occupation, it should “give[]
rise to concern whether a double standard is being invoked when such
[facially neutral] traits are implemented to disqualify a woman from
175
police duty.” It is important for the advocate to frame the litigation
in a manner that brings context to the obstacles faced by female applicants and the test results that subtly reflect such obstacles.
B. Appeal to the Factfinder’s Capacity to Dismiss Unfounded Stereotypes
Secondly, it is important to identify concrete ways in which discriminatory stereotypes hurt both female applicants and society in
general. Courts have positively received specific examples of female
applicants who had failed a test, but ultimately proved to be skillful law
enforcers. In fact, the Sixth Circuit in Zamlen v. City of Cleveland expressed the possibility of overturning trial verdicts that exclude the
testimony of female employees hired prior to the implementation of
176
Because these employees would have spothe selection procedure.
ken to the fact that the 1983 “physical performance examination [was]
not representative of their actual duties,” the court found that their
statements could have been “relevant to a central issue in this case—
177
the validity of the selection device.”
Scollay, All Male State-Funded Military Academies: Anachronism or Necessary Anomaly?, 82 W.
EDUC. L. REP. 1073, 1079 n.32 (1993) (questioning the validity of Davis’s study based on
alleged methodological flaws).
174
Brief for the United States as Appellant at 9 n.10, Lanning I, 181 F.3d 478 (3d
Cir. 1999) (Nos. 98-1644, 98-1755).
175
639 A.2d 718, 719 (N.J. 1994) (O’Hern, J., dissenting). Judge O’Hern explained
that “[a]mong [the] traits that the employing authority deems disqualifying for police
work are [being] bold, suspicious, and easily frustrated.” Id.
176
906 F.2d 209, 215-16 (6th Cir. 1990).
177
Id. at 215. However, the court did not overturn the verdict due to the exclusion
of this testimony because similar evidence was entered by male firefighters testifying on
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In Lanning I, the plaintiff produced the testimony of a SEPTA officer who had not passed the timed mile-and-a-half run but had been
178
In its statement of the facts, the Third
hired due to a clerical error.
Circuit noted:
This officer has subsequently been “decorated” by SEPTA and has been
nominated repeatedly for awards such as Officer of the Year and Officer
of the Quarter. SEPTA has commended her for her outstanding performance as a police officer and has chosen her to serve as one of SEPTA's
179
two defensive tactics instructors.

A similar commendation was put forth in United States v. City of Erie,
where the court contemplated the ability of female officers hired un180
der a previous standard that had allowed for more female hires.
Courts have proven receptive to the fact that officers can perform at
exceptional levels despite having failed the selection procedure put
forth by the employer.
Courts have also responded positively to expert testimony critiquing
the merits of tests. In Brunet v. City of Columbus, female firefighters challenged a physical test that, inter alia, required applicants to climb and
181
descend a five-story high ladder. The plaintiffs’ expert concluded that

their behalf. Id. at 216. Nevertheless, the court made it a point to note that the exclusion was “unfortunate” and, without the male firefighter’s testimony, would likely have
been found to be prejudicial. Id.
178
181 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit noted, moreover, that
“SEPTA has promoted incumbent officers who have failed . . . the physical fitness test,”
and that “SEPTA has never disciplined, terminated, removed, reassigned, suspended or
demoted any transit officer for failing to perform the physical requirements of the
job”—all while women comprised only sixteen of its 234-member police force. Id.
179
Id.
180
See 411 F. Supp. 2d 524, 566-67 (W.D. Pa. 2005). As the court stated,
[T]he majority (five) of the eight female officers currently on the City’s police
force were hired before the City began using the [physical-agility test] in
1994. . . .
The City has presented no evidence that Detective Kemling or Detective
Sergeant Mangan were ever unable to perform the physical tasks required by
their jobs. On the contrary, Detective Sergeant Mangan has been promoted
twice and received a commendation for her police work. Detective Kemling has
been a field training officer and has been promoted to the rank of detective.
Id. (citations omitted).
181
642 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D. Ohio 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 1 F.3d 390 (6th
Cir. 1993). In Brunet, the city administered the ladder climb to two sets of firefighter
applicants—one in 1980 and a second in 1984—and in those years respectively four
and two females, but 105 and 124 males, eventually met the necessary requirements to
become firefighters. Id.
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182

the test was a poor metric of endurance and agility.
The court explained that “[t]he inevitable result of this narrowed focus upon
strength is that relatively small differences in strength will tend to determine whether an individual is selected as a firefighter. There is no
guarantee . . . that in selecting stronger individuals, individuals with
183
greater endurance and agility are also being selected.” Finding that
it was important for the test to cover the range of abilities necessary to
perform a firefighter’s job, the court directed the city to redesign its
184
test accordingly.
In fact, scholars have argued that advocates in race-based disparate
impact cases should take note of the ability of claimants in gender-based
cases to demonstrate that a discriminatory procedure hinders the accu185
racy of the test and therefore hurts the overall quality of employees.
Professor Helen Norton, for example, asserts that the Ricci decision
stems from an assumption of a zero-sum state of equality—that “a decision maker’s concern for the disparities experienced by members of one
racial group (‘empathy’) inevitably includes the intent to discriminate
186
against others (‘prejudice’).” In order to rebut the notion of zero-sum
equality, Professor Norton points to arguments used in Harless, Berkman,
187
and other cases involving gender-based physical-selection procedures.
182

Id. at 1222.
Id.
184
Id. at 1222, 1250.
185
Professor Ann McGinley argues that assessment centers may be “the preferable
method[] of measuring job skills while simultaneously permitting cities to promote a
[racially] diverse population.” Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities
Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 621 (2010). But assessment centers may
have a harmful effect on female applicants if the employer does not sufficiently control
for the so-called “double bind” predicament. Id. The “double-bind” predicament was
first introduced in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and refers to the fact that women who
seek employment in a traditionally male occupation are criticized for their aggressiveness and thus placed “in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they
behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this
bind.” 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion). For example, Professor Madeline
Heilman and her coauthors examined gender norms for women by having subjects
review information about an employee they were told recently completed a training
program. The researchers found that “it is only women, not men, for whom a unique
propensity toward dislike is created by success in a nontraditional work situation.”
Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male
Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416, 421, 426 (2004).
186
Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 202 (2010).
187
See id. at 255-56 (emphasizing that successful arguments have pointed to the lack
of a “meaningful relationship” between physical-ability tests and actual job requirements).
183
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Here, “attention to disparate impact spurred better hiring for key public
188
Advocates in race-based cases may do well to learn
safety positions.”
from their gender-based counterparts in framing arguments to demonstrate that disparate impact analysis protects “classes who may not be
recognized as productive because of traditional yet unexamined assumptions.” In so doing, those advocates may ultimately produce a net
189
social gain.
C. Address Valid Safety Concerns by Providing
Concrete Reasonable Alternatives
Undoubtedly, there are valid public safety concerns at stake in
public safety occupations. Likewise, there are valid concerns, both
fiscal and social, when proposing expansions of gender-based disparate impact claims. It is important that advocates assuage these fears by
demonstrating (1) that such changes have occurred elsewhere without
adverse consequence to public safety and (2) that such an overhaul is
not as drastic as it may at first appear.
In many of the cases that have successfully invalidated selectionprocedure examinations, plaintiffs have been able to propose a reasonable alternative, fulfilling the third prong of the traditional disparate
190
In Blake v. City of Los Angeles, for example, the disimpact analysis.
trict court found that the LAPD “could be so structured as to permit
the employment of an equal percentage of male and female applicants,” but that it “could not be required to adopt less discriminatory
191
alternatives if they required modification of departmental policies.”
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “[s]o long as nondiscriminatory alternatives serve the legitimate interests of the police
in safe and efficient job performance, police departments cannot pursue policies that require the use of selection standards that are them192
selves prima facie violations of Title VII.”
188

Id. at 256.
Id. at 259.
190
See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that alternative bases in the form of written intelligence exams existed for selecting police officers
since these “tests did not have a statistically disparate impact between males and females”); EEOC v. Simpson Timber Co., No. 89-1455, 1992 WL 420897, at *4-5 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 7, 1992) (summarizing reasonable alternatives to the physical-abilities test
used by the employer to select employees for logging and timber operations).
191
595 F.2d 1367, 1383 (9th Cir. 1979).
192
Id. One reasonable alternative that is currently popular in firefighter cases is the
Candidate Physical-Ability Test (CPAT). For further information regarding the CPAT,
189

Wu FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/11/2012 12:55 PM

Scaling the Wall and Running the Mile

1235

In contrast, a plaintiff’s failure to provide an alternative proposal
can draw a rebuke from the court. Recently, in United States v. Massachusetts, a federal district court considered the legality of Massachusetts’s
eleven-event Caritas Physical-Abilities Test (PAT), which the State used
193
to select correctional officers. Roughly ninety-seven percent of men
194
Howbut only fifty-five percent of women passed the PAT in 2007.
ever, the plaintiff did not provide a reasonable alternative for screening and selecting correctional officer applicants. The court ultimately
denied the Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment, but it
explicitly inveighed against the United States’ choice not to provide a
reasonable alternative:
It is during trial of the third prong that the real heavy lifting would take
place and the important Congressional purpose best could be achieved.
The real question is not whether the Caritas PAT results in a disparate impact on women (it does), nor is it whether the test is job related and implemented to achieve public policy goals (we’ll see). The real question is
whether we can do better. Can we achieve those same public policy goals
and reduce or eliminate the disparate impact on women? Trial of the
third prong would have explored those important issues in a fair and nuanced manner with the goal of truly achieving equal economic opportunity
for both men and women while, at the same time, achieving the Commonwealth’s significant public policy goals.
Instead, the United States has reneged on its promise of evidence as to
195
the third prong . . . .

Although Judge Young ultimately ruled against his original line of reasoning, it is clear from the opinion that his disdain for the govern196
ment’s failure to proffer an alternative remained.
Additionally, plaintiffs have had success in deflating public safety
concerns by pointing to irregularities in a city’s physical-fitness standard.
In Harless v. Duck, for instance, the Sixth Circuit relied in part on the
see Roger Waters, CPAT Firefighter Physical Ability Test—What Is It and How to Prepare for
It, EZINE @RTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?CPAT-Firefighter-Physical-Ability-Test--What-Is-It-And-How-To-Prepare-For-It (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
193
781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4, 9 (D. Mass. 2011).
194
Id. at 9.
195
Id. at 20-21.
196
See id. at 13. Indeed, Judge Young seemed to suggest that the third prong of the
test was nearly the downfall of the litigation. He noted, “[A]s the United States simply
gave up on the third prong, I [originally] thought myself entitled to infer that it had
nothing better to offer than a reversion to the disparate treatment of the [Commonwealth’s previous] test . . . . On this record, I thought such an order [ordering the
Commonwealth to develop a better alternative under federal court supervision] would
contravene . . . congressional intent . . . .” Id.
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fact that the city had eliminated the physical-ability test from a more
recent selection procedure with “apparently . . . no detrimental effect
197
on the police department.” Similarly, in Blake, the Ninth Circuit rejected the business necessity defense: “The fact that the LAPD hired
thousands of male police officers between 1968 and 1973 without using any pre-employment physical test suggests that the practice is not
198
essential to safe and efficient job performance.”
Another argument that may be effective is to point out that in many
instances applicants, once employed, are not required to pass physical
examinations on a regular basis. In Lanning I, for example, the Third
Circuit noted that SEPTA tried to discipline incumbent officers who
failed fitness tests but that it discontinued this practice due to protests
199
A city advocating that “more is better” with
by the officers’ union.
regard to the physical fitness of the group as a whole might struggle to
substantiate that claim if it allows law enforcement officers to regress
after they are hired.
D. The Doctrine Shall Set You Free
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, successful advocates consistently refer back to the disparate impact doctrine itself. The beauty
of this doctrine, as laid out in Griggs and subsequent Supreme Court
case law, lies in its fundamental simplicity: if the plaintiff proves that
the defendant’s practice has a disparate impact on a protected class,
that practice violates Title VII unless the defendant can prove that the
practice is not based on stereotypical classifications but rather reflects
200
If subsequent lower courts become
an actual business necessity.
mired in the details, it is helpful to remind them that such details may
be inconsistent with the law as put forth by the Supreme Court. The
Court has made no mention of adequate applicant preparation, nor
197

619 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1980).
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1382 (9th Cir. 1979).
199
181 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1999). As the court explained, “SEPTA has promoted
incumbent officers who have failed some or all of the components of the physical fitness test. SEPTA has also given special recognition, commendations, and satisfactory
performance evaluations to incumbent officers who have failed the physical fitness
test.” Id. In Lanning II, the Third Circuit likewise found that “[t]here has been no
showing . . . that fitness level at the time of application is a reliable proxy for fitness
level on the job over the ensuing years,” and “SEPTA has promoted officers who failed
the running test” as well as “extended [offers] as much as two and one-half years after
the aerobic running test is administered.” 308 F.3d 286, 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2002).
200
See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
198
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public safety doctrine, nor any idea that “more is better.” And it most
certainly has not alluded to any doctrinal distinction between racebased and gender-based disparate impact claims.
Professor Michael Selmi has written, “The faith so many scholars
and advocates have imbued in the disparate impact theory largely ignores much of what we have learned about the way in which the law
201
I disaworks to preserve social norms rather than to upend them.”
gree. History has shown time and again that the relationship between
the law and the progression of social norms is symbiotic, complex, and
dynamic. It is true that gender-based disparate impact case law as it currently stands is not as helpful as feminist advocates would like, but that
does not mean that we should stop aiming for the ideal. Indeed, the
success of one subset of gender-based disparate impact cases, physicalselection procedure cases, should give hope to advocates seeking to
reclaim the ideals of Title VII.
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court decided the landmark Dothard case,
gender-based disparate impact causes of action have been limited in
sphere and scope. But there remains room for growth. This Comment’s examination of the case law surrounding physical-selection procedures reflects the challenges of a theory highly dependent on the
factfinder’s ability to free herself from pervasive assumptions. Female
plaintiffs must combat unfounded assumptions and doctrinal nonstarters both in establishing prima facie cases and in rebutting affirmative
defenses. They face failure-to-train claims and rallying cries of “more is
better” and “strength is everything”—beliefs that are inconsistent with
Griggs and other Supreme Court case law but which nevertheless persist.
However, the success of physical-selection procedure cases also
suggests that the expansion of the disparate impact cause of action is
possible, so long as advocates adhere to certain basic principles in
framing their arguments. First, advocates must provide context for the
problem at hand. Second, advocates must recognize any persistent stereotypes and make them palpable to the factfinder. Third, advocates
must address valid concerns by providing reasonable alternatives or
other similar analogies. Fourth, and most importantly, advocates must
consistently tie arguments back to the Supreme Court doctrine and

201

Selmi, supra note 75, at 707-08.
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the congressional intent that framed it. Physical-selection procedure
advocates may confront a set of obstacles along the way, but advocates
have and will continue to succeed. Maintaining this subset of successful litigation is pivotal not only to the gender-based disparate impact
movement but also to the disparate impact movement overall.

